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The paper analyses the transmission of liquidity shocks and risk shocks to global ￿nancial
markets. Using a Global VAR methodology, the ￿ndings reveal fundamental di⁄erences in
the transmission strength and pattern between the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis and the 2010-11
sovereign debt crisis. Unlike in the former crisis, emerging market economies have become much
more resilient to adverse shocks in 2010-11. Moreover, a ￿ ight-to-safety phenomenon across
asset classes has become particularly strong during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis, with risk
shocks driving down bond yields in key advanced economies. The paper relates this evolving
transmission pattern to portfolio choice decisions by investors and ￿nds that countries￿sovereign
rating, quality of institutions and their ￿nancial exposure are determinants of cross-country
di⁄erences in the transmission.
JEL Classi￿cation: E44, F3, C5.
Keywords: global ￿nancial crisis, sovereign debt crisis, liquidity, risk, capital ￿ ows, trans-
mission, high dimensional VARs, advanced economies, emerging market economiesNon-technical summary
Even after the global ￿nancial crisis of 2007-08 started abating, the European sovereign debt
crisis, concerns about US debt and worries about a repeated global economic downturn have induced
a sizeable adjustment in asset prices and in the allocation of liquidity in 2010 and 2011. Yet these
two crises have a⁄ected countries and asset markets very di⁄erently. Many observers and policy-
makers have pointed to the importance of shocks to liquidity and to risk in explaining the dynamics
of both the global crisis of 2007-08 and the 2010-11 debt crisis. In particular the squeeze of liquidity
in 2008, which implied a drying up of liquidity among ￿nancial institutions, forced many banks and
investors to repatriate capital to ￿nance investment and meet redemption calls, thus triggering a
￿ ight-to-safety phenomenon. However, such a phenomenon has been largely absent in 2010-11, at
least until a slowdown in the second half of 2011, and in fact capital overall has continued to pour
into EMEs.
This paper analyses the global transmission of the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis and the 2010-11
sovereign debt crisis via shocks to liquidity and shocks to risk. The objective of the paper is
threefold. First, we analyse how shocks to liquidity and risk are transmitted to ￿nancial markets
globally and how they help us understand the dynamics of the two di⁄erent crisis episodes. We
don￿ t only look at a broad set of 28 EMEs and AEs, but importantly, we analyse the response
of asset prices (equity markets and bond yields) as well as of exchange rates and capital ￿ ows in
equities and bonds in order to gauge the functioning of the transmission channels. A strength of the
analysis is that we are able to use relatively high-frequency weekly data to gauge the transmission
of shocks through global ￿nancial markets, employing also relatively new data on high-frequency
private portfolio capital ￿ ows. Second, we speci￿cally analyse how and why the 2007-08 ￿nancial
crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis have been di⁄erent. And third, we attempt to shed light
on the portfolio decisions by investors, and their determinants.
A simultaneous empirical analysis of asset prices, exchange rates as well as capital ￿ ows across 28
countries is far from straightforward. Altogether we have 144 endogenously related variables. Such
a large dimensionality renders traditional VAR models inapplicable. We employ a relatively novel,
so called in￿nite-dimensional VAR methodology, ￿rst introduced by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b),
which allows us to treat all variables as endogenous. Restrictions to overcome the dimensionality
2problem in this approach are based on an economically intuitive concept and allow for rich spatial
and temporal interactions among variables.
The empirical analysis highlights four key ￿ndings. First, the transmission of liquidity shocks
and risk shocks is highly heterogeneous ￿ across countries, across asset classes and over time.
Shocks to liquidity and to risk exhibited much larger e⁄ects on asset prices and on capital ￿ ows
during the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis than either in the pre-2007 period or the 2010-11 sovereign debt
crisis, highlighting that these two crises have (so far) been very di⁄erent in the way markets have
responded. There are also important cross-country di⁄erences. EMEs have been a⁄ected much
more strongly ￿both in terms of asset prices and capital ￿ ows ￿by shocks during the 2007-08
crisis, often exhibiting a sensitivity to shocks that has been twice as large as that for AEs.
Second, the ￿ndings of the analysis yield clear evidence of a strong geographic ￿ ight-to-safety
phenomenon during the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis, but much less compelling evidence of such a pattern
since 2009. Third, the analysis uncovers evidence for a portfolio rebalancing motive for relatively
safe ￿nancial assets ￿primarily for bonds in AEs ￿implying a negative correlation between returns
and ￿ ows into these assets conditional on shocks to risk. By contrast, there is a mostly positive
correlation between returns and ￿ ows for relatively more risk assets ￿portfolio equity assets in AEs
and especially EME equities and bonds ￿akin to a return chasing motive.
Fourth and ￿nally, the paper attempts to identify some of the determinants that explain the
di⁄erences of the transmission of shocks across countries. We employ a Bayesian Averaging of
Classical Estimates (BACE) approach, and ￿nd that the transmission of risk and liquidity shocks
across countries was in￿ uenced by countries￿ ￿nancial exposure to the US. As a second set of
factors, countries￿exposure to liquidity and risk shocks is dependent on the strength of countries￿
own fundamentals. Those economies with a poor sovereign rating and worse economic and political
institutions were substantially more a⁄ected by risk and liquidity shocks in both crises. These
￿ndings have important implications, not just for our understanding of the global transmission of
the crisis, but also about what economic policy can do to shield the domestic economy from global
shocks.
31 Introduction
Global ￿nancial markets and capital ￿ ows have been tremendously volatile ever since the onset of
the global ￿nancial crisis in August 2007. Even after the global ￿nancial crisis of 2007-08 started
abating, the European sovereign debt crisis, concerns about US debt and worries about a repeated
global economic downturn have induced a sizeable adjustment in asset prices and in the allocation
of liquidity in 2010 and 2011. Yet these two crises have a⁄ected countries and asset markets very
di⁄erently. Despite having the US as an origin, the 2007-08 crisis a⁄ected asset prices and capital
￿ ows to emerging market economies (EMEs) more strongly than those in advanced economies (AEs)
as capital ￿ ed EMEs, triggering a collapse in EME asset prices and exchange rates, while bu⁄ering
the decline in asset prices and even inducing an exchange rate appreciation in many AEs. By
contrast, the 2010-11 crisis has seen a remarkable resilience of EMEs, both in terms of the e⁄ect
on the real economy and on ￿nancial markets.
Many observers and policy-makers have pointed to the importance of shocks to liquidity and to
risk in explaining the dynamics of both the global crisis of 2007-08 and the 2010-11 debt crisis. In
particular the squeeze of liquidity in 2008, which implied a drying up of liquidity among ￿nancial
institutions, forced many banks and investors to repatriate capital to ￿nance investment and meet
redemption calls, thus severely restricting the capital available to the real side of the economy and
triggering a major global recession (Adrian and Shin (2010), Borio (2009), Tirole (2010)). Moreover,
the rise in risk and risk aversion in 2007-08 induced a ￿ ight-to-safety phenomenon, which not only
entailed a rebalancing towards safer asset classes, but also a massive capital ￿ ight from supposedly
riskier countries ￿foremost EMEs ￿to advanced economies. These large capital out￿ ows worsened
the real and ￿nancial impact of the 2007-08 crisis on EMEs in particular. However, such a ￿ ight-
to-safety phenomenon out of EMEs has been largely absent in 2010-11, and in fact capital has
continued to pour into EMEs.
This paper analyses the global transmission of the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis and the 2010-11
sovereign debt crisis via shocks to liquidity and shocks to risk. The objective of the paper is
threefold. First, we analyse how shocks to liquidity and risk are transmitted to ￿nancial markets
globally and how they help us understand the dynamics of the two di⁄erent crisis episodes. We
don￿ t only look at a broad set of 28 EMEs and AEs, but importantly, we analyse the response
of asset prices (equity markets and bond yields) as well as of exchange rates and capital ￿ ows in
4equities and bonds in order to gauge the functioning of the transmission channels. A strength of the
analysis is that we are able to use relatively high-frequency weekly data to gauge the transmission
of shocks through global ￿nancial markets, employing also relatively new data on high-frequency
private portfolio capital ￿ ows.
Second, we speci￿cally analyse how the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt
crisis have been di⁄erent, both in the scope with which di⁄erent countries have been a⁄ected and
in the way shocks to risk and liquidity have been transmitted. And third, we attempt to shed light
on the portfolio decisions by investors, and their determinants, during the two crises by analysing
portfolio choice of investors both geographically (across countries) and across asset classes in order
to understand the di⁄erences across crisis episodes.
An simultaneous empirical analysis of asset prices, exchange rates as well as capital ￿ ows across
28 countries is far from straightforward. Altogether we have 144 endogenously related variables.
Such a large dimensionality renders traditional VAR models inapplicable. We employ a relatively
novel, so called in￿nite-dimensional VAR methodology introduced by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b)
and later extended by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a). This methodology allows us to treat all
variables as endogenous, which is arguably a very important advantage for our purpose. Restrictions
to overcome the dimensionality problem in this approach are based on an economically intuitive
concept and allow for rich spatial and temporal interactions among variables. In particular, we
allow for the US to potentially have a dominant in￿ uence on other countries, and we also allow for
other (unknown) sources of strong cross-section dependencies besides the dominant US variables.
Neighborhood e⁄ects (i.e. lags of other variables entering the relation for a given unit) and an
unspeci￿ed weak-form cross-section dependence of innovations are also fully accounted for.1 The
distinction between the weak and strong cross-section dependence also helps us to distinguish global
shocks (which could originate in the US) from local idiosyncratic shocks. To distinguish between
di⁄erent types of global shocks, we combine several pieces of information in the form of restrictions
on the signs of impulse responses.
The empirical analysis highlights four key ￿ndings. First, the transmission of liquidity shocks
and risk shocks is highly heterogeneous ￿ across countries, across asset classes and over time.
Shocks to liquidity and to risk exhibited much larger e⁄ects on asset prices and on capital ￿ ows
during the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis than either in the pre-2007 period or the 2010-11 sovereign debt
1See Chudik, Tosetti, and Pesaran (2011) for de￿nition of weak and strong cross section dependence.
5crisis, highlighting that these two crises have (so far) been very di⁄erent in the way markets have
responded. There are also important cross-country di⁄erences. EMEs have been a⁄ected much
more strongly ￿both in terms of asset prices and capital ￿ ows ￿by shocks during the 2007-08
crisis, often exhibiting a sensitivity to shocks that has been twice as large as that for AEs. By
contrast, EME markets did not respond di⁄erently to shocks in 2010-11 than in the more tranquil
pre-2007 period, suggesting that there has be some de-coupling of EMEs from AEs in 2010 and
2011 relative to previous crises.
Second, the ￿ndings of the analysis yield clear evidence of a strong geographic ￿ ight-to-safety
phenomenon during the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis, but much less compelling evidence of such a pattern
since 2009. For instance, in the 2007-08 crisis a rise in risk triggered not only a decline in bond
yields in the US and other AEs, but it raised bond yields in EMEs dramatically, caused an exchange
rate depreciation and induced large net capital out￿ ows for EMEs. By contrast, in 2010-11 EME
bond yields have hardly responded to such shocks, while the drop in equity returns and portfolio
investment in equities and in bonds has been very similar for EMEs as for AEs.
Third, the analysis uncovers an interesting pattern of portfolio choice among investors. An
important part of the literature on portfolio choice has been investigating whether investor deci-
sions are driven by a portfolio rebalancing motive (building on the seminal work by Branson and
Henderson (1985)) where market incompleteness and risk induce investors to aim for a stable allo-
cation across assets in their portfolios ￿thus implying a negative correlation between returns and
investment (￿ ows) into a given asset. On the other hand, another strand of the literature has em-
phasised the role of a return chasing motive (building on the work by Bohn and Tesar (1996), and
Brennan and Cao (1997)) which implies a positive correlation between returns and investment of a
￿nancial asset. The analysis in the present paper ￿nds evidence for a portfolio rebalancing motive
for relatively safe ￿nancial assets ￿primarily for bonds in AEs ￿implying a negative correlation
between returns and ￿ ows into these assets conditional on shocks to risk. By contrast, there is
a mostly positive correlation between returns and ￿ ows for relatively more risk assets ￿portfolio
equity assets in AEs and especially EME equities and bonds ￿akin to a return chasing motive.
We link these ￿ndings to the ￿ ight-to-safety phenomenon observed in particular during the 2007-08
￿nancial crisis.
Fourth and ￿nally, the paper attempts to identify some of the determinants that explain the
6di⁄erences of the transmission of shocks across countries. In particular, we analyze to what extent
it was the external exposure - either through trade linkages or through ￿nancial linkages - and
to what extent it was idiosyncratic, country-speci￿c characteristics ￿such as related to countries￿
macroeconomic fundamentals and perceived riskiness ￿that made countries vulnerable to di⁄erent
types of external shocks. For this purpose, we employ a Bayesian Averaging of Classical Esti-
mates (BACE) approach of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). It combines the averaging of cross-section
estimates across models estimated by classical least squares, and is in particular useful for under-
standing which variables in a large set of potential determinants might have played a role. We
￿nd that the transmission of risk and liquidity shocks across countries was in￿ uenced by countries￿
￿nancial exposure to the US. As a second set of factors, countries￿exposure to liquidity and risk
shocks is dependent on the strength of countries￿own fundamentals. Those economies with a poor
sovereign rating and worse economic and political institutions were substantially more a⁄ected by
risk and liquidity shocks in both crises. These ￿ndings have important implications, not just for
our understanding of the global transmission of the crisis, but also about what economic policy can
do to shield the domestic economy from global shocks.
We stress a number of caveats and limitations to the analysis of the paper. Importantly, we limit
our analysis to two types of shocks ￿shocks to liquidity conditions and to risk ￿while ignoring other
shocks which have been relevant during the two crises. Such shocks may be related to economic
activity, the conjunctural situation of a country, or they be related to systemic events such as the
collapse of ￿nancial institutions. Moreover, we limit our analysis to shocks that are mainly global
in nature, while we do not investigate the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to any of the 28 economies
of the analysis. All these raise interesting and important issues, but ones that go beyond the scope
of this paper.
The paper relates to di⁄erent strands of the literature. One such strand is the literature on
the transmission of the 2007-08 global ￿nancial crisis, which has given particular prominence to
the role of liquidity shocks (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); Calomiris (2008) and Taylor
(2009)). An emerging literature analyses the global transmission of the crisis and the question
through what channels and via which market segments the transmission took place, stressing the
relevance of liquidity and ￿nancial constraints (e.g. Tong and Wei (2009)) or of equity and FX
markets (Bekaert et al. (2011), Fratzscher (2009)).
7More generally, the issues we address relate closely to a vast literature on modelling the inter-
national transmission mechanism in ￿nancial markets. Important recent work is by Diebold and
Yilmaz (2009) who propose a spillover index derived from a VAR analysis of a broad set of equity
markets, or Dungey and Martin (2007), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bekaert et al. (2005) who
investigate the role of contagion for a broad set of countries and market segments. Ehrmann et al.
(2010) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that such an international transmission may occur
not only within asset classes but also across asset classes. As to the transmission channels, Forbes
and Chinn (2004) stress the role of real and trade linkages through which some countries may be
more strongly a⁄ected by global common or regional shocks, while Fratzscher (2011) highlights that
both push factors (such as related to global risk and liquidity conditions) as well as pull factors
(country-speci￿c fundamentals and institutions) have played an important role in explaining the
pattern of global capital ￿ ows. Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) also analyse the transmission of global
shocks, but their focus is more narrowly on equity and money markets, while excluding exchange
rates, bond markets and capital ￿ ows from the analysis.
A third strand relates to the methodology and the literature on Global VARs. Pesaran et al.
(2004) provided the seminal contribution and proposed a framework for modelling international
linkages in a Global VAR setting, which was then applied and extended in a number of papers,
including DØes, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), Pesaran, Schuermann, and Treutler (2007),
and Pesaran, Smith, and Smith (2007). Chudik and Pesaran (2011a,b) provided a methodological
foundation of the conditional models estimated in a GVAR framework, treating all variables as
endogenously determined in one global system. We also follow these latter two papers to specify
our models, allowing for a very rich spatio-temporal linkages among markets and economies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical methodology, including the
identi￿cation of shocks to risk and to liquidity. The various data series and sources are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 then presents the ￿ndings of the empirical analysis, starting with the results
based on the impulse response functions and concluding with the ￿ndings about the determinants
of the global transmission process to di⁄erent countries and market segments. Section 5 summarises
the main points and concludes.
82 A global model of ￿nancial markets
In this section, we present the empirical methodology employed to analyse the transmission of
shocks to liquidity and risk in a large system with a large set of countries. The section also outlines
how the impulse response functions are speci￿ed and used to analyse the transmission mechanism
of shocks.
2.1 The model
Let xit denote a vector of ki domestic variables of country i = 1;2;:::;N in period t = 1;2;:::;T.
All, domestic and foreign, variables are jointly determined and it is supposed that the vector of all
k =
PN
i=1 ki variables in the global system, denoted as xt = (x0
1t;:::;x0
Nt)
0, is given by the following
factor-augmented VAR model:
xt = ￿xt￿1 + ￿ft + ut, (1)
where ￿ is (large) k ￿ k matrix of coe¢ cients, ut = (u0
1t;:::;u0
Nt)
0 is k ￿ 1 vector of reduced form
errors, ￿ is k￿m matrix of factor loadings, m is (unknown) number of unobserved common factors,
and ft is m ￿ 1 vector of unobserved common factors given by the following VAR model:
ft = ￿ft￿1 + vt. (2)
We abstract here in the notation from higher order lags and from deterministic terms to keep the
exposition simpler.
Without any loss of generality, denote the US as a country N throughout the paper. Our set
of endogenous variables is:
xit = (iit;rit;eit;￿it;{it)
0 , for i = 1;2;:::;N ￿ 1,
that is for all economies except the US, and
xNt = (iNt;rNt;eNt;￿Nt;{Nt;vixt;tedt)
0 ,
for the US economy, where iit denotes the ￿rst di⁄erence in long term government bond yields (in
country i and period t), rit denotes stock market returns, eit is the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate
9return, ￿it denotes the net capital in￿ ows into bonds markets of country i, {Nt denotes the net
capital in￿ ows in the stock markets of country i, vixt is the ￿rst di⁄erence in the log of the VIX
index, and tedt is the the US ted spread. Thus ki = 5 for i < N, and kN = 7.
2.2 Solution to the curse of dimensionality
The drawback of the high-dimensional model (1)-(2) is that the reduced form coe¢ cients cannot be
estimated by conventional methods since the number of variables, k, is large (of comparable size to
the time dimension), and the number of unknown coe¢ cients grows at a quadratic rate with k. We
restore to the method proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a,b) to deal with this proliferation
of parameters, also known as the ￿ curse of dimensionality￿problem. In line with this approach, we
assume that the coe¢ cient matrix can be partitioned as
￿ = ￿a + ￿b,
where ￿a captures all neighborhood relationships as well as possible (global) dominance of selected
variables and is given by
￿a = DS,






















with Di having dimensions ki￿di, S is known d￿k matrix that de￿nes neighbors and/or dominance
of individual units, and it is conveniently partitioned as S = [S1;S2;:::;SN]
0 below, where Si is
k ￿ di. The matrix ￿b captures the non-neighbor relationships and its elements, denoted as ￿b;ij;








, for all i and j,
10where the constant K does not depend on the number of cross section units. The non-neighbor
relationships could be motivated by diversi￿cation motives of economic agents, or could simply
arise from an error in the speci￿cation of spatial weigh matrices in S, see Chudik and Pesaran
(2011b) for further details.
The construction of S is crucial in this framework. We construct this matrix based on the
following three principles: (i) we allow for dominance of the US variables, that is we do not restrict
any of coe¢ cients corresponding to direct contemporaneous or lagged in￿ uence of the US, (ii)
own lags of domestic variables are also selected, and ￿nally (iii) we allow for neighbors in form of
spatial weighted averages of foreign trading partners, where the weights are constructed from data
on bilateral portfolio holdings. The matrix S =[S0
i] is thus given by
Si = (E1;Ei;Wi); for i = 1;2;:::;N ￿ 1,
and
SN = EN;
for the US, where Ei, for i = 1;2;:::;N, is k￿ki selection matrix that selects the vector of domestic
variables, in particular E0
ixt = xit. The US is not assumed to have any neighbors, more on this
below.
Chudik and Pesaran (2011a,b) establish that under the assumptions discussed above and few
other regularity conditions (see Theorem 2 in Chudik and Pesaran (2011b), and Theorem 1 in
Chudik and Pesaran (2011a)), it is possible to estimate the coe¢ cients corresponding to the neigh-
bors and own lags by Augmented Least Squares (ALS) using the following (augmented) country-
speci￿c regressions:
















Granular cross section averages
+ eit, (3)
for i = 1;2;:::;N ￿ 1, where the truncation lag q has to be selected as an appropriate increasing
function of the sample size. Furthermore,
eit ￿ E (uit juNt)
q:m:
! 0,
11as k;q ! 1, and the equation (3) with q ! 1 is large k representation of the variable xit in the
high dimensional model given by (1)-(2). It is interesting to highlight that despite one lag assumed
in the VAR model (1), the dominant units enter ALS regressions with more lags. The intuition
behind this result and the discussion about identi￿cation issues in the presence of dominant unit
are provided in Chudik and Pesaran (2011b).
The granular cross-section averages, denoted as xt, are used to take the e⁄ects of unobserved
common factors into account. The original idea of using the cross section averages to take into
account e⁄ects of unobserved common factors in the context of panel estimation was proposed by
Pesaran (2006) and this idea was later explored in the context of high dimensional VARs by Chudik







to take into account the e⁄ects of unobserved common factors, which is in general su¢ cient when
m does not exceed the dimension of xt, in our case 5.
The dominant unit has to be treated di⁄erently from the remaining units, due to its non-
negligible impact on the rest of the system as a whole and the corresponding nonnegligible second-
round e⁄ect on the dominant unit itself. As suggested by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a), we estimate




















where the US variables are treated as endogenously determined with the vector of cross section
averages. System of estimated equations (3) and (4) turns out to be asymptotically su¢ cient
description of the underlying high-dimensional model (1)-(2) for the purpose of impulse response
analysis or forecasting. Let us de￿ne zt = (x0
t;x0
t)
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This paper focuses on the impact of global shocks and their transmission across countries, market
segments, and time. There are kN +m global shocks in the system (1)-(2), consisting of the kN US
innovations in vector uNt and m unobserved common factor innovations in the vector vt. These
innovations are spanned by the reduced form errors estimated based on the marginal model (4),
provided that m is not larger than the number of cross section averages (k). As a result of the
dominance of the US variables, the reduced form innovations uNt and vt are not identi￿ed, only
the reduced form errors eNt in the marginal model are identi￿ed.2
One possibility to study the implications of the high-dimensional VAR model would be to
conduct generalized impulse response analysis. However, generalized impulse response functions
cannot be given an economic interpretation, and therefore, we focus on structural impulse responses,
as opposed to the generalised impulse responses, in our comparison of the pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis periods.
2.4 Identi￿cation of shocks
As explained above, our focus is on the transmission of risk shocks and liquidity shocks to global
￿nancial markets. In the benchmark speci￿cation, risk is proxied through the VIX and liquidity
through the US TED spread, as these are the most widely used measures for risk and liquidity
2See Chudik and Pesaran (2011a) for details.
13conditions, both for the US and globally. Moreover, we analyse how asset prices (equity returns
and bond yields), exchange rates and capital ￿ ows (into bonds and equities) respond to risk and
liquidity shocks. We identify the liquidity shock and the risk shock by imposing a priori knowledge
on the behavior of selected ￿nancial market variables in response to such global shocks. Our
identi￿cation scheme is in the form of sign restrictions on the impulse responses and combines the
schemes used in Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) and Bussiere, Chudik, and Mehl (2011).
An important question is the separation of liquidity shocks and risk shocks. The short-run sign
restrictions imposed for identi￿cation stem from the literature of time-varying risk of economic
disaster and its impact on asset prices and the business cycle (see e.g. Barro (2006), Gabaix
(2007), Gourio (2010)). Gourio (2010) shows that disaster risk lowers returns of risky ￿nancial
assets (e.g. equities) while increasing the price, i.e. reducing the yield of relatively safer ￿nancial
assets, such as sovereign bonds. Following this argument, we identify shocks to risk as an increase in
the VIX coupled with a drop in both US equity returns and US bond yields, and an aprpeciation of
save-haven currencies (US dollar, yen and Swiss franc). Importantly, note that no other restrictions
are imposed on any of the non-US/foreign variables. By contrast, a shock to liquidity is identi￿ed
as a rise in the TED spread, together with an increase in US bond yields and a drop in US equity
returns. Again, we impose these sign restrictions only on the response of these US variables.
Table 1 summarizes the information used to di⁄erentiate the risk and liquidity shocks from
other global shocks.
Table 1: Summary of sign restrictions on contemporaneous responses.
US variables non-US variables
bonds stocks US dollar vixt tedt Swiss franc Japanese yen
risk shock ￿ ￿ + + . + +
liquidly shock + ￿ . . + . .
3 Data
We now describe the data. Our analysis uses weekly data. Using weekly, rather than lower frequency
data has the advantage that it captures better the transmission of shocks in ￿nancial markets.
14Moving to higher than weekly frequency is complicated by the non-overlapping trading times across
markets, a problem which is reduced by using weekly frequency. Data sample starts in 2005, which
allows us to distinguish between a pre-crisis period - 1 January 2005 - 6 August 2007, a crisis period
- 7 August 2007 - 10 July 2009, and post-crisis period 17 July 2009 - 13 July 2011.
Overall, we have data on 28 advanced and emerging economies, representing about 86% of
world output (in 2011 and in market prices). In order to detect larger trends and patterns and
for better clarity of exposition, we distinguish between groups of countries, in particular between
advanced economies (which excludes the US itself) and emerging markets. An alternative aggre-
gation is across regions, distinguishing between Advanced Europe (euro area, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK)3 and other advanced economies (Japan, New Zealand, Australia), as
well as across emerging market regions - Emerging Asia (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand), Emerging Europe (Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Russia, and also including Turkey and South Africa), and Latin America (Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico). Other emerging economies have been excluded because of data issues.
All of the ￿nancial market variables we use stem from Bloomberg, Datastream, and Haver
Analytics, and have a standard de￿nition. For government bond yields, we use longer maturities
(5-10 years, where available). For stock markets, we use MSCI country indices in local currency. We
use local currency returns in order to be consistent with the measurement of the government bonds,
as well as to avoid that changes in the comovement across equity markets results from changes in
exchange rate comovements. Nominal e⁄ective exchange rates are BIS broad (58 country) indices
with the exception of the euro, which is based on the ECB de￿nition. Table 1 provides a detailed
description of the data. Figure A.1 examines comovements in the transformed data - weekly changes
in bond yields, weekly returns on stock market indices, and weekly returns on e⁄ective exchange
rates- using Pesaran￿ s CD test statistics and one year rolling windows. These results shows that (i)
the highest co-movement is in stock markets (CD tests are in the range 50-90), followed by bond
markets (15-30), while foreign exchange markets commove the least (-5 to + 15). Noting that this
statistics is normally distributed under the null of no cross-section dependence, it is clear that these
comovements are quite signi￿cant; albeit no clearly interpretable time pattern can be depicted from
Figure A.1.
Finally, a fairly novel contribution of the paper is the use of high-frequency data on capital
3Note that we treat the euro area as a single economy, rather than taking its member states individually.
15￿ ows, which stems from the data provider EPFR.4 The data covers weekly net ￿ ows of portfolio
equity and of bonds for a broad set of advanced and emerging markets, and is based on portfolio
decisions of abpout 16,000 equity funds and about 8,000 bond funds. Although EPFR capital
folow data captures only about 5-20% of the market capitalization in equity and in bonds for most
countries, they have been shown to be strongly correlated with BoP data at lower frequencies.
Hence they constitute good proxies for the overall capital ￿ ows for equities and for bonds. The
data is transformed into a sample that ￿ts the purpose of the analysis for the paper. Speci￿cally,
net capital ￿ ows are aggregated at the level of each recipient country.
4 Findings
This section reports the empirical ￿ndings. The benchmark estimates of the high-dimensional VAR
models are summarized in Subsection 4.1. The subsequent subsection then presents the ￿ndings
from the impulse response analysis, while the ￿nal subsection reports on the determinants of the
di⁄erences in the cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of shocks.
4.1 Estimation results for High dimensional VAR models
The estimation results indicate that our high-dimensional VAR models appear to describe the
dynamic interactions between markets and countries well. This sub-section reports on a broad
range of speci￿cation tests.
First, the estimated models are stable. The absolute value of the largest eigenvalue equal 0.59
in pre and post-crisis periods and 0.51 in the crisis period. In all cases it is well below one implying
systems are stable. We would expect crisis period to exhibit more persistence compared to the pre
and post-crisis periods, due to presumably larger limits to arbitrage during the crisis. Figure A.2









, for s = 1;2;::, (6)
where P 2 fpre;crisis;postg is subscript denoting the three estimation periods, s is chosen time
horizon, b ￿P;j is j-th estimated eigenvalue and n￿ is the number of eigenvalues. According to this
4See Fratzscher (2011) for more details on this data set.
16measure, overall persistence is very similar in pre-crisis and post-crisis VARs, and slightly more
elevated during the crisis, as expected, but the di⁄erences between the crisis and the tranquil
periods appear quite small.
Second, many of the estimated coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant. A summary of signi￿-
cance levels for selected groups of coe¢ cients is reported in Table A.2. It is interesting to see that
there are lot of similarities across the three estimation periods. The same market contemporaneous
cross-section averages are highly signi￿cant in 96% cases for stock market, and about 67%-85%
for foreign exchange and bond markets. Cross-section averages from di⁄erent markets appear not
very important, perhaps with the exception of foreign exchange market during the crisis period
(signi￿cant in 15% and 22% of countries for bonds and stock markets, respectively). Contempora-
neous US variables are also very important within a given market segment. The US exchange rate
is found to be important also for stock markets in all three periods, and high rejection rates are
found for US bond yields in stock and foreign exchange markets regressions in the crisis period as
well. The crisis period seems to have slightly higher rejection rates, possibly indicating a stronger
degree of cross-section dependence compared to tranquil periods. Contemporaneous values of VIX
and TED have rather small rejection rates (4-11%) with the exception of the TED spread during
the crisis (11-26%). Finally, it is interesting that own lags of bond yields are generally important
also for other market segments in all periods. This is not the case for the own lags of stock returns
and foreign exchange markets.
Third, the signs and magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are intuitive and economically meaningful.
We report a summary of contemporaneous (short-run) elasticities in Table A.3. Contemporaneous
elasticities of cross-section averages are in line with those reported in the literature. We ￿nd a
broadly stable average elasticity for AE stock markets of about 0.71-0.74, while this elasticity is
larger than one and broadly stable at about 1.15 in case of emerging economies. The di⁄erence
between advanced and emerging economies is more stark in case of bonds and foreign exchange
markets. Focusing still on the results for cross-section averages, the average elasticity in the case
of advanced bond markets is about 0.36-0.66 and in the case of emerging bond markets it is about
1.12-1.32. The results for the foreign exchange market also suggest that emerging markets are much
more responsive to global market movements, with emerging market elasticities reaching 1.21-1.33,
whereas this elasticity is only 0.18-0.39 in the case of advanced economies. An interesting pattern
17emerges when looking at the results in the bottom half of Table A.3, which summarizes our ￿ndings
for the contemporaneous elasticities of the US variables. The signs of emerging market elasticities
are always opposite to the signs of advanced economies elasticities, suggesting quite di⁄erentiated
e⁄ects of the US variables on the rest of the world ￿a pattern we will investigate in detail below
in the next sections. In the case of bond and stock markets, advanced economies elasticities of US
variables are positive across all periods, whereas the corresponding emerging economies elasticities
are negative.
Fourth, the ￿t of conditional models is generally high and driven mostly by the contemporaneous
cross-section dependence. At the same time, the marginal models have a relatively low ￿t. Table
A.4 reports a summary of adjusted R2. Looking at the marginal stock markets models (US & CS
averages), the ￿t is negligible, between -4% to +3% in the tranquil periods and slightly larger 6%-
10% in the crisis periods. Marginal foreign exchange market models have also a low ￿t in the range
-3% to 5% with the exception of the post-crisis period. Two patterns emerge from bottom part of
Table A.4. On the one hand, AE bond and stock markets have a higher ￿t compared to emerging
markets in all estimation periods, by a large margin - about 8 to 30 percentage points. Since the ￿t
of the marginal models is driven mainly by contemporaneous cross-section dependence, this suggests
that the degree of cross-section dependence in bond and stock markets across advanced economies
is higher than in emerging markets, where idiosyncratic shocks are perhaps more important.
Last but not least, the examination of model residuals does not reveal any important irregular-
ities.5
4.2 Impulse response functions and variance decomposition
We now turn to the benchmark results based on the impulse responses functions discussed in
Sections 2 and the corresponding variance decompositions. Figures A.3-A.12 show the e⁄ect of risk
shocks on the ￿ve variables of interest ￿bond yields, equity returns, exchange rates, bond ￿ ows and
equity ￿ ows ￿distinguishing between the more tranquil pre-crisis period (January 2005 to 6 August
2007), the 2007-08 global ￿nancial crisis (7 August 2007-10 July 2009) and the post-crisis period
with the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis (11 July 2009-13 July 2011). The ￿gures on the left-hand-side
provide the country-speci￿c contemporaneous e⁄ects, while those on the right show GDP-weighted
averages of these responses by region or country group. Figures A.13-A.22 provide corresponding
5Residual based statistics are not reported due to space considerations.
18results for shocks to liquidity.
FIGURES A.3-A.22
Given the many elements of the estimates, we organise the discussion of the results along
three dimensions ￿a magni￿cation e⁄ect analysing the changes in the strength of the transmission
across di⁄erent time periods, a rebalancing e⁄ect highlighting di⁄erences across countries, and a
composition e⁄ect focusing on changes in portfolio allocations across asset classes.
Magni￿cation e⁄ect
A ￿rst striking empirical ￿nding is the much stronger e⁄ect of shocks to liquidity and to risk
on virtually all variables ￿ asset prices, exchange rates and capital ￿ ows ￿ during the 2007-08
￿nancial crisis. For many of the variables, the e⁄ects of risk and liquidity shocks are twice as large
in 2007-08 than in other periods, highlighting that not only risk increased and liquidity contracted
dramatically during that period, but that the sensitivity of ￿nancial markets and investors to a
given shock rose substantially.
By contrast, no such systematic increase seems to be present in the 2010-11 sovereign debt
crisis. In fact, it is striking that the response of EME bond yields and EME capital ￿ ows to risk
and liquidity shocks in the 2009-11 period seems to be muted, exhibiting a similar or even weaker
response pattern than even during the more tranquil 2005-07 pre-crisis period. The responses of
AEs to such shocks is also mostly lower in the 2009-11 period than the 2007-08 crisis, but this
reduction is generally much smaller than for EMEs. Hence, overall, a ￿rst key result is that the
transmission process of liquidity and risk shocks during the sovereign debt crisis is fundamentally
di⁄erent from the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis. Although EMEs are still generally more a⁄ected by a
given shock in 2009-11, the e⁄ects of shocks have become a lot more similar across countries.
Rebalancing e⁄ect
The IRFs show that shocks both to risk and to liquidity generally induce a rebalancing out of
EMEs and into AEs, and in particular into the US. Most striking and visible is this ￿nding for
the response of equity ￿ ows, which in some cases exhibit net in￿ ows to the US and mostly massive
out￿ ows out of EMEs in response to shocks.6
6Note that the units shown on the y-axis of the ￿gures for portfolio capital ￿ ows refer to ￿ ows relative to total
assets under management (AUM); hence ￿gures for EMEs are in some cases substantial given the much smaller size
of those markets and corresponding AUM.
19Consistent with this picture of rebalancing in capital ￿ ows is the response of asset prices and
exchange rates. Most importantly, a positive shock to risk raises bond yields in EMEs but lowers
them in most AEs. What is striking is that the sensitivity of bond yields of AEs to risk shocks is
largest not during the 2007-08 crisis ￿as it is for EME yields ￿but during the 2010-11 sovereign
debt crisis. This increase in sensitivity is most visible for the US, Switzerland, Norway and the
UK.7
The same opposite signs in the sensitivity to risk and liquidity shocks across countries is observed
for exchange rates. Several AE currencies rise in response to shocks to risk and liquidity, while
EME currencies depreciate. What appears to be most striking for the response of exchange rates
is the high degree of heterogeneity across countries. For AEs, safe-haven currencies such as the US
dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc appreciate the most, while commodity currencies, such as the
Australian dollar and New Zealand dollar exhibit very substantial depreciations. A similar degree
of dispersion is found for EMEs: several currencies of Latin American and Emerging European
countries depreciate strongly to risk shocks, while those of Asian economies are mostly stable or
even appreciate along with the US dollar, underlining the lower ￿ exibility or pegging of those
currencies to the US dollar.8
Overall, the evidence on the rebalancing e⁄ects across countries strongly points towards a ￿ ight-
to-safety phenomenon of investors, where in response to adverse shocks to liquidity and in particular
to risk capital is withdrawn from countries and markets that are perceived to be relatively less safe
and are repatriated to those that are considered safer. Not only the response in portfolio ￿ ows,
but also the response of asset prices and the exchange rate is fully consistent with this hypothesis.
Importantly, such a ￿ ight-to-safety phenomenon appears to be particularly strong during the 2010-
11 sovereign debt crisis for some AEs.
Composition e⁄ect
A third dimension is to take an investor perspective and analyse how shocks to risk and liquidity
a⁄ect the portfolio choice of investors across di⁄erent asset classes. As discussed in the Introduction,
a large literature has analysed to what extent and under what circumstances it is a portfolio
7The euro area is included as an aggregate, rather than as individual euro area countries, which may mask a lot
of heterogeneity across euro area countries. Given that the data for exchange rates and capital ￿ ows is for the euro
area as a whole, our preferred choice is to analyse the euro area as a whole, rather than individual countries in the
euro area.
8Note that the use of e⁄ective exchange rates makes these di⁄erences in cross-country patterns appear smaller. For
instance, the e⁄ective depreciation of Latin American currencies is likely to be smaller than the bilateral depreciation
against the US dollar if currencies of close trading partners move in the same manner.
20rebalancing motive or a return chasing motive that drives investment decisions. The correlation
pattern across responses of returns on ￿nancial asset, on the one hand, and ￿ ows, on the other,
allow us to gauge which of these motives is dominant and during which periods.
Table A.6
For this purpose, Table A.6 provide the sign correlations across the responses of the ￿ve en-
dogenous variables for di⁄erent shocks and time periods, with the responses being those shown
in Figures A.3-A.22. It is important to recall that for bonds we measure the reaction of yields,
rather than of returns, to risk and liquidity shocks. A decline in the yield of a particular bond ,
for instance, implies a rise in the price and hence a positive return of that bond. For the purpose
of the discussion on portfolio choice, we therefore focus here on the return dimension.
The key ￿nding of such an analysis is that a portfolio rebalancing motive appears to dominate
for relatively safe ￿nancial assets ￿primarily for bonds in AEs ￿as the IRFs for these exhibit a
negative correlation between returns and ￿ ows conditional on shocks to risk. By contrast, there is
a mostly positive correlation between returns and ￿ ows for relatively more risky assets ￿portfolio
equity assets in AEs and especially EME equities and bonds ￿a pattern suggesting the dominance
of a return chasing motive.
In more detail, for EMEs, Table A.6 and the IRFs in Figures A.3-A.22 show a positive correlation
between returns (equity returns, bonds returns and exchange rate changes) and net ￿ ows into
equities and bonds conditional on liquidity and risk shocks. In other words, investor decisions with
regard to EMEs appears to exhibit a strong positive relation between returns and ￿ ows, which
suggest a return chasing motive being the dominant driver for such investments. In contrast, for
investments AE bond and FX markets, there is a negative relation between returns and net ￿ ows
conditional on risk shocks.
As a ￿nal note, A.23-A.27 show the variance decomposition for risk shocks. The most important
point here is that risk shocks explain quite a substantial share of the movements in asset prices,
exchange rates and capital ￿ ows. There appear to be no systematic di⁄erences across country groups
or time periods, underlining the points of the previous sub-section that our VAR speci￿cation indeed
performs well for a broad set of countries and time periods.
FIGUREs A.23-A.27
21In summary, the results reveal some striking changes in the global transmission of risk and
liquidity shocks, both over time and across countries. Importantly, the transmission process during
the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis appears to have been fundamentally di⁄erent from the 2007-08
￿nancial crisis ￿ the shock transmission has become much more similar across countries, with
EMEs no longer being most exposed to adverse shocks to global liquidity and risk. Moreover, the
transmission pattern we have discovered stresses the importance of a ￿ ight-to-safety phenomenon,
which has become stronger during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis, in particular with a rise in risk
driving down bond yields in key AEs.
4.3 Determinants of cross-country di⁄erences in the transmission of shocks
The previous section has highlighted that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity across
countries in the response patterns to global risk shocks. This section analyses what factors may
help explain this cross-country heterogeneity.
To shed light on the cross-section heterogeneity in the transmission of the global shocks to the
rest of the world, we estimate the following cross-section regression
y
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i , for i = 2;:::;N,
where y
(a)
i is the contemporaneous impact of a global shock a (to risk or liquidity) on the stock
market, the foreign exchange market or the money market of country i, and xi‘ for i = 1;:::;N ￿1
and ‘ = 1;2;:::;K is the set of K fundamentals speci￿c to country i.
We focus on two alternative explanations for why a country may respond more or less strongly to
a given US-speci￿c shock than other countries. A ￿rst potential explanation is the direct exposure
to the US economy, either through trade or through ￿nancial linkages. One would expect that
countries with more trade with the US (relative to domestic GDP, or to total trade) or with
stronger ￿nancial linkages are a⁄ected more strongly, as the crisis in the US should set o⁄ a decline
in US import demand and a repatriation of capital to the US. An alternative explanation is that
the global shock transmission may depend on the strength of country-speci￿c fundamentals. This
implies that during a crisis, investors may not withdraw capital indiscriminately, but may focus on
those with weaker fundamentals and less resilience to external shocks.
22Hence, our set of regressors includes both the country-speci￿c macro variables (such as the cur-
rent account, reserves, trade openness, ￿nancial integration), country-speci￿c institutional variables
(the quality of the institutions) and also bilateral trade and ￿nancial debt and equity exposures to
the United States. A full list is provided in Table 2.
Table 2: List of country fundamentals.
Macroeconomic
Openness, ￿nancial integration, rating notches, reserves as a share of GDP
unemployment, growth, current account as a share of GDP
Quality of institutions
ICRG institutional measures: political category index, ￿nancial category index,
economic category index
Bilateral exposure to US
trade exposure, ￿nancial debt exposure, ￿nancial equity exposure
We have in total 14 candidate explanatory variables and our country dimension is 28. Hence,
instead of running least squares on the full set of regressors, or a general-to-speci￿c selection
procedures to select a parsimonious model, we adopt the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates
(BACE) approach, as outlined by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), to analyze factors behind the cross-
country heterogeneity of the transmission of US shocks to the rest of the world. The BACE
approach was used by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) to analyze determinants of growth. It combines
the averaging of estimates across models estimated by classical ordinary least squares (OLS) and
is particularly useful for understanding which of the large set of determinants (if any) might play
a role empirically. We refer reader for the detailed description of BACE approach to Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004).
We run three di⁄erent BACE estimations, one for each period (the periods before during and
after the crisis). Summary of the importance of individual fundamentals in explaining the transmis-
sion process is reported in Table A.5. This table reports posterior inclusion probabilities and value
larger than 50% indicates that the fundamental might have played a role in explaining the cross
section heterogeneity. Overall, the results provide evidence that real or ￿nancial exposure to the
US has played a substantial role in explaining the global transmission of the crisis. By contrast, the
quality of institutions and domestic fundamentals - such as the size of reserves and the sovereign
23rating - appear to have been relevant as well.
We stress that this evidence is no more than illustrative as our analysis here is conducted
purely in the cross-section, and the size of our cross-section is limited to the 28 economies in our
sample. Nevertheless, these points help illustrate the heterogeneity and some of the sources of the
heterogeneity in the global transmission process.
5 Conclusions
The global economy and global capital markets have become increasingly integrated and inter-
dependent over the past decade. The purpose of this paper has been to understand the global
transmission process of important shocks during crisis periods ￿shocks to liquidity and to risk ￿
across di⁄erent ￿nancial market segments for a broad set of 28 advanced and emerging economies.
The paper has used a relatively novel empirical methodology, building on the growing literature
on high-dimensional VARs, which speci￿cally takes into account the rich dimensionality of this
multi-country and multi-market setting.
The speci￿c interest of the empirical analysis of the paper has been to understand the changes
in the transmission process over time. A key ￿nding highlights the di⁄erence between the 2007-
08 ￿nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis. Shocks during the 2007-08 crisis were
transmitted much more strongly and in a much more heterogeneous fashion, with EMEs being
a⁄ected substantially more strongly than AEs ￿with both asset returns and capital ￿ ow responses
being consistent with a clear and persistent ￿ ight-to-safety pattern from the former to the latter.
By contrast, the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis has been di⁄erent in that a ￿ ight-to-safety pattern
has been observed across asset classes rather than between EMEs and AEs, with bond markets of
a few select AEs experiencing a marked drop in yields in response to risk shocks. In particular,
EMEs have been much more resilient and less severely a⁄ected by the 2010-11 sovereign debt
crisis. Consistent with this pattern, a portfolio choice perspective on investor decisions indicates
the presence of a negative conditional correlation pattern between returns and ￿ ows for AE bond
markets ￿akin to a portfolio rebalancing motive ￿whereas investment decisions in EMEs have
more generally exhibited a positive conditional correlation with asset returns.
The ￿ndings of the paper raise a number of issues. One intriguing, yet open issue is whether the
2010-11 sovereign debt crisis constitutes a structural break for the global transmission process in
24that investments in EMEs are no longer considered the most risky types of investment. Our ￿nding
that sovereign ratings explain some of the cross-country di⁄erences in the sensitivity to shocks is
consistent with the presence of such a structural change ￿as di⁄erences in sovereign risk between
AEs and EMEs have indeed become smaller (or in some cases even reversed), adverse shocks to
global liquidity and risk may no longer have a larger e⁄ect on EMEs.
Another open issue relates to what policy can do to shield the domestic economy and domestic
markets from adverse global shocks. The suggestive ￿ndings on the determinants of the global
shock transmission acknowledge the role of ￿nancial exposure and integration of countries as a
transmission channel. Yet the ￿ndings also underline the importance of sovereign ratings and the
quality of domestic institutions as transmission channels, hence factors that are indeed very much
the consequence of domestic policy choices.
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28A Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Data sources
Bonds Stocks E⁄. exchange rates
Source and Source and Source and
Description the mnemonic the mnemonic the mnemonic
Argentina JPM EMBI global D: JPMGARG(BYTM) B: MXAR Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.AR.02
Brazil JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBBR(RY) B: MXBR Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.BR.02
China JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBCI(RY) B: MXCN Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.CN.02
Czech Rep. 10 year gov. bond SDW: IRS.D.CZ.L.L40 B: MXCZ Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.CZ.02
.CI.0000.CZK.N.Z
Hong Kong JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGHKKK$(RY) B: MXHK Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.HK.02
Hungary JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGHNKHF(RY) B: MXHU Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.HU.02
India JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBIN(RY) B: MXIN Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.IN.02
Indonesia JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBID(RY) B: MXID Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.ID.02
Malaysia JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBMY(RY) B: MXMY Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.MY.02
Mexico JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBMX(RY) B: MXMX Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.MX.02
Philippines 10 year gov. bond H: T566GA@INTDAILY B: MXPH Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.PH.02
Poland JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBPO(RY) B: MXPL Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.PL.02
Russia JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBRS(RY) B: MXRU Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.RU.02
Singapore JPM GBI All Mat. D: JGSPAS$(RY) B: MXSG Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.SG.02
South Africa JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGSAKSR(RY) B: MXZA Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.ZA.02
Taiwan 2 year gov. bond B: GVTW2YR Index B: MXTW Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.TW.02
Thailand JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBTH(RY) B: MXTH Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.TH.02
Turkey JPM GBI-EM D: JGEMBTK(RY) B: MXTR Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.TR.02
Australia JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGAUKA$(RY) B: MXAU Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.AU.02
Denmark JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGDKKDK(RY) B: MXDK Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.DK.02
Euro Area 3 year gov. bond B: GECU3YR Index B: MXEU Index SDW: EXR.D.Z64.EUR.EN00.A
Japan 10 year gov. bond B: GJGB10 Index B: MXJP Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.JP.02
New Zealand JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGNZKZ$(RY) B: MXNZ Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.NZ.02
Norway 10 year gov. bond B: GNOR10Y Index B: MXNO Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.NO.02
Sweden JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGSDKSK(RY) B: MXSE Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.SE.02
Switzerland 10 year gov. bond B: GSWISS10 Index B: MXCH Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.CH.02
UK JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGUKKU£ (RY) B: MXGB Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.GB.02
US JPM GBI 5-10Y D: JGUSKU$(RY) B: MXUS Index SDW: BISM.D.QREA.US.02
Notes: All stock market indices are MSCI indices. E⁄ective exchange rates are BIS 58 currency
indices, with the exception of Euro, which is taken from ECB (EER-20 currency index).
Sources: D - denotes datastream
B - detones Bloomberg
SDW - denotes European Central Bank￿ s Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW)
H: denotes Haver Analytics
BIS - denotes Bank of International Settlements
JPM - denotes JP morgan
29Table A.2: Signi￿cance of estimated coe¢ cients
Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
markets markets markets
bonds stocks FX all bonds stocks FX all bonds stocks FX all
Contemporaneous cross section averages:
bonds 67% 7% 0% 25% 85% 7% 4% 32% 81% 0% 15% 32%
stocks 4% 96% 11% 37% 11% 96% 7% 38% 7% 96% 7% 37%
FX 7% 7% 70% 28% 22% 15% 70% 36% 7% 11% 70% 30%
Contemporaneous US variables (dominant markets):
bonds 52% 0% 0% 17% 52% 30% 26% 36% 37% 4% 19% 20%
stocks 4% 11% 4% 6% 15% 41% 7% 21% 7% 52% 4% 21%
FX 11% 26% 93% 43% 15% 37% 85% 46% 0% 22% 70% 31%
VIX 4% 11% 7% 7% 11% 11% 0% 7% 11% 4% 4% 6%
TED 11% 4% 15% 10% 11% 26% 15% 17% 11% 7% 11% 10%
Own lags:
bonds 21% 29% 43% 31% 21% 18% 36% 25% 29% 36% 21% 29%
stocks 18% 14% 4% 12% 18% 57% 14% 30% 0% 14% 7% 7%
FX 11% 4% 18% 11% 4% 18% 21% 14% 7% 14% 14% 12%
Note: This table reports share of signi￿cant coe¢ cients at the 5% nominal size of tests. Entries lower than 5% are highlited by
gray color.
Table A.3: Contemporaneous elasticities.
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Bonds Stocks FX Bonds Stocks FX Bonds Stocks FX
Average elasticity of cross section averages on their domestic counterparts
advanced 0.47 0.71 0.18 0.36 0.74 0.32 0.66 0.74 0.39
emerging 1.22 1.17 1.33 1.32 1.15 1.21 1.12 1.16 1.24
Average elasticity of US variables on their counterparts in other economies
advanced 0.36 0.05 -0.58 0.33 0.26 -0.38 0.22 0.35 -0.47
emerging -0.23 -0.04 0.32 -0.19 -0.10 0.21 -0.11 -0.15 0.27
Please see notes to Table A.4 for the list of advanced and emerging economies.
30Table A.4: Adjusted R2 measures of model ￿t.
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Market Market Market
bonds stocks FX ave bonds stocks FX ave bonds stocks FX ave
Marginal models:
US 8% 2% -1% 3% 16% 6% 5% 9% 31% -1% 3% 11%
CS averages 27% -4% -3% 7% 25% 10% 2% 12% 11% 3% 16% 10%
Conditional models:
advanced 54% 58% 37% 49% 51% 77% 47% 58% 53% 69% 44% 55%
emerging 27% 49% 42% 39% 43% 69% 48% 53% 33% 55% 48% 45%
Notes: Group of advanced countries excludes the US and consists of Australia, Denmark, Euro Area, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK. Group of emerging economies consists of Argentina, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Turkey. Average ￿t is reported for
each group of countries.
Table A.5: Importance of country fundamentals in explaining the transmission of
shocks: Posterior inclusion probabilities.
Number of times with larger p-value than 50% The largest p-values
Fundamental: before during after sum before during after
Openess 0 0 1 1 0.32 0.31 0.69
Financial Integration 0 0 0 0 0.29 0.25 0.43
Trade exposure 0 1 3 4 0.37 0.56 0.64
Financial equity exposure 2 3 1 6 0.72 0.91 0.57
Financial debt exposure 0 1 0 1 0.40 0.67 0.37
Rating notches 3 1 3 7 0.91 0.96 0.99
ICRG: political 0 1 1 2 0.47 0.55 0.71
ICRG: ￿nancial 2 1 1 4 1.00 0.96 0.91
ICRG: economic 0 0 0 0 0.29 0.25 0.26
Market capitalization 1 0 0 1 0.69 0.45 0.47
Reserves 1 0 0 1 0.63 0.24 0.45
Unemployment 2 0 0 2 0.84 0.49 0.38
Economic growth 0 0 0 0 0.45 0.26 0.39
Current account 0 0 0 0 0.28 0.31 0.29
31Table A.6: Sign correlations matrix of the shock responses across all countries.
Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis
stock FX bond stock stock FX bond stock stock FX bond stock
ret. ret. ￿ ows ￿ ows ret. ret. ￿ ows ￿ ows ret. ret. ￿ ows ￿ ows
All countries
Risk shock
bond yields 0.21 -0.43 -0.18 0.14 0.21 -0.14 0.18 0.21 0.14 -0.14 -0.07 0.07
stock returns 1 0.07 0.54 0.93 1 0.50 0.96 1.00 1 0.43 0.71 0.93
FX returns 1 0.18 0.14 1 0.46 0.50 1 0.43 0.36
bond ￿ ows 1 0.68 1 1.42 1 0.95
Liquidity shock
bond yields -0.36 -0.14 -0.04 -0.29 -0.07 -0.21 -0.04 0.00 -0.79 -0.29 -0.07 -0.71
stock returns 1 0.21 0.25 0.79 1 -0.14 0.68 0.64 1 0.21 0.14 0.79
FX returns 1 0.25 0.14 1 -0.11 -0.07 1 0.29 0.14
bond ￿ ows 1 0.37 1 1.11 1 0.11
Advanced economies
Risk shock
bond yields 0.36 -0.21 n.a. 0.29 0.36 0.07 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.07 0.32 0.29
stock returns 1 -0.21 n.a. 0.29 1 0.07 0.36 0.36 1 0.07 0.32 0.29
FX returns 1 n.a. -0.14 1 0.07 0.07 1 0.04 0.00
bond ￿ ows 1 -0.11 1 0.53 1 0.37
Liquidity shock
bond yields 0.00 0.14 n.a. 0.00 0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.21 -0.07 -0.18 -0.21
stock returns 1 0.07 n.a. 0.21 1 -0.07 0.36 0.21 1 0.07 0.32 0.21
FX returns 1 n.a. 0.07 1 -0.07 0.07 1 0.04 0.07
bond ￿ ows 1 0.00 1 0.32 1 0.26
Emerging economies
Risk shock
bond yields -0.14 -0.21 -0.18 -0.14 -0.14 -0.21 -0.18 -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.39 -0.21
stock returns 1 0.29 0.54 0.64 1 0.43 0.61 0.64 1 0.36 0.39 0.64
FX returns 1 0.18 0.29 1 0.39 0.43 1 0.39 0.36
bond ￿ ows 1 0.79 1 0.89 1 0.58
Liquidity shock
bond yields -0.36 -0.29 -0.04 -0.29 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.57 -0.21 0.11 -0.50
stock returns 1 0.14 0.18 0.57 1 -0.07 0.32 0.43 1 0.14 -0.18 0.57
FX returns 1 0.25 0.07 1 -0.04 -0.14 1 0.25 0.07
bond ￿ ows 1 0.37 1 0.79 1 -0.16
Notes: Sign correlation is computed as a simple correlation coe¢ cient of the signs (i.e. +1, 0 or -1) of the corresponding
impulse response impacts on di⁄erent variables. Results for the bond ￿ ows prior the crisis are not reported because
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Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.3: Contemporaneous impact of one unit risk shock on bond markets in di⁄erent regions

























































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.4: Contemporaneous impact of one unit risk shock on bond markets in di⁄erent countries





















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.5: Contemporaneous impact of one unit risk shock on equity markets in di⁄erent regions
























































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.6: Contemporaneous impact of one unit risk shock on equity markets in di⁄erent countries





















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.7: Contemporaneous impact of one unit risk shock on foreign exchange markets in di⁄erent




















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.8: Contemporaneous impact of one unit risk shock on foreign exchange markets in di⁄erent





















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.9: Cumulative impact of one unti risk shock on bond ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent





















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.10: Cumulative impact of one unit risk shock on bond ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent





















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.11: Cumulative impact of one unit risk shock on equity ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent




















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.12: Cumulative impact of one unit risk shock on equity ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent






















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.13: Contemporaneous impact of one unit liquidity shock on bond markets in di⁄erent




















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.14: Contemporaneous impact of one unit liquidity shock on bond markets in di⁄erent























Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.15: Contemporaneous impact of one unit liquidity shock on equity markets in di⁄erent





















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.16: Contemporaneous impact of one unit liquidity shock on equity markets in di⁄erent




















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.17: Contemporaneous impact of one unit liquidity shock on foreign exchange markets in






















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.18: Contemporaneous impact of one unit liquidity shock on foreign exchange markets in






















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.19: Cumulative impact of one unit liquidity shock on bond ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent






















































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.20: Cumulative impact of one unit liquidity shock on bond ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent




















Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Figure A.21: Cumulative impact of one unit liquidity shock on equity ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent























































































































































































































Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
Advanced Europe Other Advanced Emerging Asia Emerging Europe LATAM
Figure A.22: Cumulative impact of one unit liquidity shock on equity ￿ ows after 4 weeks in di⁄erent
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Figure A.27: Variance decompositions: risk shock as a driver of equity ￿ ows (four-weeks ahead).
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